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This article is extracted from a MORS 
Oral History Project interview of Eugene P. 
Visco, FS. Another portion of the interview 
has been published as "One Analyst's Ex-
perience with Chemical Munitions Test-
ing." 
MR. SHELDON: We're here today on 
behalf of MORS to interview Mr. Gene 
Visco. Today is the 30th of October 2000. 
We're conducting this interview in Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania, because MORS is holding a 
C4ISR workshop at the Army War College 
this week. My name is Bob Sheldon. Partic-
ipating with me in this interview of Mr. 
Visco is Jack Marriott, currently Chair of 
the MORS Heritage Committee. Gene, I 
would like to start out by having you give 
vour name, rank and serial number, and 
any other basic information you'd care to 
provide. 
MR. VISCO: My full name is Eugene 
P. Visco, but I'm known as Gene most of 
the time. I was born in 1927. My e-mail 
address is gvisco@bellatlantic.net. I'm re-
tired, doing some part-time work for a little 
company called Simulation Technologies, 
Incorporated. Despite my cynical attitude 
toward models, I'm doing verification and 
validation of a Marine Corps chemical/bi-
ological model. I'm doing some indepen-
dent research, principally on an analytic 
process for operations other than war. I'm 
still trying to work on friendly fire and on 
human behavior in combat. I teach a course 
in the history of operations other than war 
at George Mason University. I'm trying to 
get my students to develop analytic tools 
on operations other than war. 
MR. SHELDON: What was your job 
three years ago, when you retired from the 
Army? 
MR. VISCO: In Federal Government 
terms, I was a supervisory operations re-
search analyst. I was in the Office of the 
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for 
Operations Research, Walter Hollis, FS1 
who is the Army Sponsor of MORS, and 
Jack Marriott was in the office toward the 
end of my tour. I worked for Walt for ten 
years. Prior to working for him, I worked 
for the Chief of Staff in a similar capacity. 
MR. SHELDON: Where were you 
born, raised, and educated? 
MR. VISCO: I was born in Boston, 
Massachusetts. People tell me that still 
creeps into my dialect. I lived in Boston 
until I was about 12. 
I went to public school in Boston and 
actually started high school there at what 
was then called Mechanic Arts High 
School, which was an engineering high 
school. It taught mechanical drawing, 
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drafting, engineering skills, preliminary 
kinds of things. 
I went for my freshman year there, the 
Depression was just ending, with indus-
tries getting ready for the war. My father 
got a job in a foundry in Worcester, Mas-
sachusetts, which was a big industrial town 
in the central part of the state. 
We moved to a little town called 
Shrewsbury, just east of Worcester, and I 
continued high school there in my sopho-
more year. That high school had a college 
prep program and a commercial program 
for kids who weren't going to go college. I 
learned typing, a little bookkeeping, and 
that sort of thing. 
I started there in the fall of '41, and we 
know what happened that December. So 
very quickly, I switched from the com-
merce part of the program to a college pro-
gram. People were thinking about what 
things were going to be like after the war, 
and the high school revamped its program 
so that it made an enormous number of 
mathematics and science courses available. 
It also included an aeronautics course 
which all the male students took. 
I spent the last two years of high school 
taking lots of mathematics and lots of sci-
ence. In April of '44 when I turned 17, I 
enlisted in the Navy. The Navy allowed me 
to complete my high school work. I gradu-
ated two months later and reported for ac-
tive duty about two or three days after 
graduation in June. 
I went into a naval aviation program 
but as a sailor, not as an officer candidate, 
and I was enlisted as something called air 
crewman. I was trained as an ordnance-
man, and I was given a modest amount of 
training in radar operation, which was very 
primitive at the time. All the air crewmen 
had to go through that. 
Then I went to gunnery school. There 
was one story about my earlier experiences 
in the Navy, when I was going through 
aerial gunnery school. During the war, the 
Navy taught aerial gunnery, starting out by 
using shotguns and shooting at clay pi-
geons to give us some training in how to 
lead the clay pigeon as though you might 
be leading at attacking aircraft, if you were 
flying an airplane with hydraulic turrets, 
and gunnery. Using shotguns was easier 
and cheaper than using a machine gun. 
We had ring sights on the shotguns, 
very much like the ring sights that we 
would have with our machine guns in the 
turrets that are on the airplanes. But there 
was one little significant test that the in-
structors had us go through. We had to 
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and the master eye is the dominant eye. One of 
your eyes, normally, is a dominant focusing or 
aiming eye. The little test that you use to deter-
mine your master eye is you hold a finger out 
at, let's say, the intersection of the walls in a 
room with the ceiling. Now you've got to point. 
You do that with your eyes open, and then you 
alternately shut one eye and find out whether 
the apparent location of your finger moves. 
It turned out that when I did that, my left 
eye was the master eye. The training procedure 
said you should shoot from the left shoulder, if 
your left eye is a master eye for aiming pur-
poses. 
I, being right-handed, didn't want to do 
that, even though I found out I was left eyed. So 
I began shooting from my right shoulder and I 
couldn't hit any of the birds. The instructor 
looking over my shoulder was commenting on 
the fact that if I didn't start hitting some birds, 
I was going to be washed out of the program. 
Then he asked me which was my master 
eye, and I said, grudgingly, that my left eye was 
the master eye, and he chewed me out for not 
shooting from the left shoulder. 
So I shifted to the left shoulder. It was very 
awkward to do that, because being right-
handed, it's hard to start using your left hand 
against your left shoulder. But it was rather 
amazing how important that dominant eye 
was, because I began hitting the birds and 
bringing down very credible numbers of birds, 
and showed that the Navy was right in de-
manding that I do that. 
After gunnery school, I went to something 
called operational training where I linked up 
with a crew. I was assigned to a patrol bomber, 
a Martin Mariner, built by Martin, long-range 
patrol bomber, which stayed aloft 15-18 hours 
without refueling. 
MR. SHELDON: What kind of patrol 
bomber? 
MR. VISCO: Long-range patrol. It was a 
Martin Mariner, twin-engine patrol bomber 
with enormous fuel tanks and very small en-
gines. I trained with a crew, three officers and 
nine enlisted on the airplane, three mechanics, 
three radiomen, and three ordnancemen. I was 
a bow gunner who operated the bow turret. 
We trained in Corpus Christi, Texas. We 
went out to San Diego and trained some more, 
then went up to San Francisco and trained 
some more. By this time, the war was over. The 
war ended in August of '45, and we were sent 
on out to help bring all the airplanes back from 
the Pacific. We flew from Alameda-we took a 
brand new airplane out of Alameda Naval Air 
Station, near San Francisco, to Kaneohe Bay, 
Oahu, which at that time was a naval air sta-
tion. 
It took us almost 18 hours to fly from San 
Francisco to Hawaii, but we had no navigation 
problems. We hit the island right on the button. 
It's just a slow airplane. 
At that point, they didn't need ordnance-
men and gunners anymore, so they dropped 
me off the crew and I stayed at Kaneohe Bay for 
a while. In the Navy, when you end up as a 
supernumerary, either on a ship or on a shore 
base, you're put to work. So I was assigned to 
something called beaching crew-Mariners 
were not amphibious. They were flying boats, 
and when they came in, ·they landed in the 
water, then taxied up and hooked up to a buoy 
in the bay. The buoy had a line running to a 
cement block in the bottom of the bay, and then 
through a ring, or cleat, on up the shore. 
When the airplane was hooked to the buoy, 
it would cut its engines and just drift, but it was 
tied up to the buoy. A small boat would come 
out from shore with another line and hook on 
to a tail hook-these airplanes all had a ring on 
the tail, and two sailors would swim out to the 
airplane towing what was called beaching gear, 
which was just a big wheel with a floatation 
box on it, which they would float, and you 
hooked this on to the side of the airplane with 
the help of somebody inside the airplane. 
My job was to swim out to the airplane, 
towing one of these beaching gear things, and 
then when you have the gear on, you would 
simply tow the airplane up on the beach, feed-
ing the line out from the bow-it was hooked 
up through the buoy-and towing it up with 
the tail end and then towing it right up a ramp 
on to the beach. 
Needless to say, I was very healthy and 
bronzed, and my job was just to lie there in a 
pair of trunks, all day long, and wait for air-
planes to come in. Only a few planes a day 
would come in. They'd be flying back from 
further out in the Pacific. Eventually, they did 
decide they needed me in a squadron, so they 
shipped me out to the Philippines. I joined a 
squadron, VPB 28, which was stationed at Pala-
wan, the southwestern-most island of the 
group. It's a long, thin island, about 500 miles 
long and about 20 miles wide. Puerto Princesa 
was the one major town on the island, and the 
squadron was stationed there. Later, the squad-
Military Operations Research, V6 N2 2001 
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT ... EUGENE P. VISCO, FS 
ron moved up to Cavite which is on Luzon. 
Cavite is on Manila Bay. 
I came home when my points came up. We 
calculated points for returning home based on 
how much time in service, and how much time 
overseas, and if you'd been in campaigns. So 
eventually I came home. I toyed with the idea 
of staying in the Navy but I decided to come 
home, go to college, and then see what else I 
wanted to do after that. 
MR. SHELDON: How much total time did 
you have in the Navy? 
MR. VISCO: I only had a couple of years, 
most of it in training because of the technical 
training they put me through, well over a year 
of training. When I went to ordnance school, 
not only did I learn all the weapons that the 
Navy had, all weapons that were on aircraft, 
but also all hand weapons including rifles, in-
cluding the BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle). I 
knew how to strip a BAR, blindfolded. It dates 
back to World War I. It was a hell of a good 
infantry weapon. A big heavy thing. 
MR. SHELDON: Before we leave your 
Navy career, anything you learned from your 
Navy operations that helped you as an opera-
tions analyst for the Army? 
MR. VISCO: I suppose a little bit. Some 
notion of military customs, a little bit about 
military operations. One of the things that we 
were taught in ordnance school is how to make 
our own tools. We actually made open-end 
wrenches. We also learned about bombs and 
bomb racks, and air-delivered torpedoes, and 
mines. It took a long time to teach us all that 
stuff. 
MR. MARRIOTT: You were the gun-
nery-
MR. VISCO: Yes. I was. The ordnanceman 
is the guy who maintains weapons. The Navy 
calls them ordnancemen. In my case, it was 
aviation ordnanceman. I eventually got to be a 
3rd class petty officer, equivalent to an old 
''buck sergeant." It's the first of the noncommis-
sioned officer ranks. 
I liked it out in the Philippines and I really 
toyed with the idea of signing up. During the 
war, they had what they called minority enlist-
ments. Minority enlistments were-you were 
enlisted until age 21, or the war plus six 
months, whichever came later. They tried to 
recruit a lot of people to stay, but I decided to 
go home, go to school. 
My folks had migrated to Florida from 
Massachusetts. My father had worked in a 
Military Operations Research, V6 N2 2001 
foundry all through the war on the night shift. 
Terrible job. He was frozen in the job like most 
people were in the war industries. So the day 
the war ended, he quit his job. They packed up 
the household goods and drove down to Flor-
ida. When I got discharged, I went down there 
to live with them. The nearest university was 
University of Miami in Coral Gables. I enrolled 
there in the fall of' 46 and did an undergraduate 
degree, mathematics and physics. 
MR. SHELDON: How'd you happen to 
choose math and physics? 
MR. VISCO: I was doing pretty well in 
math in high school. When I went to gunnery 
school in the Navy, there was a certain amount 
of mathematics involved there-how you cal-
culate how to lead an enemy aircraft with your 
guns. We didn't have computing gun sights. So 
you had to learn a little bit about the trigonom-
etry. As an aircraft is approaching you from the 
front, it's vastly different from an aircraft ap-
proaching you from the rear, and how you 
lead. I had this affinity for mathematics any-
way. I did pretty well with the computational 
part of mathematics. 
When I graduated in 1950, the country was 
in a mild recession following the big produc-
tivity surge right after the war. I applied to a lot 
of places but I couldn't get a job. 
I pumped gas for a while, and I was work-
ing in the summertime in the Hollywood, Flor-
ida volunteer recreation program. I'd gotten 
interested in theater. I'd done some acting in 
college. So I did a little program with kids in 
the summertime, teaching them a little bit 
about theater, makeup, and how to stage a play. 
We actually put on a couple of one-act plays! 
Hollywood was the location of a military 
school called Riverside Military Academy, 
which had its main campus in Gainesville, 
Georgia. It's a small town in the mountains of 
Georgia. 
The old general ran a very expensive mili-
tary high school and prep school. He would 
have his kids report in the fall in Gainesville, 
Georgia. Then at Christmas break, he would 
move to Hollywood, Florida for the midwinter 
term so the kids could be close to their rich 
parents vacationing in Miami Beach or in Hol-
lywood. 
Then in the spring, they'd close up and 
move back to Gainesville, Georgia. He was 
looking for a drama coach, and he asked some-
body in Hollywood did they have any ideas, 
and they said, well, there's a young guy who's 
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workffig with these kids. This old general of-
fered me a job to teach physics and public 
speaking-a crazy mixture, and to be the 
drama coach too! He really needed a drama 
coach. I jumped at it. I reported in September of 
'SO to Gainesville, and was introduced as a 
junior member of the faculty. Had to wear uni-
forms, most of them wore Army type stuff. I 
think my pay was $1200 a year, but I got room 
and board, such as it was. 
I discovered very quickly that that was not 
for me. You needed to be a real disciplinarian. 
There were some kids there who were second 
and third generation Riverside kids, whose fa-
thers, grandfathers, had gone there and gone 
on to military careers. It was good prep school 
for getting kids ready for the military. But there 
was another bunch, there because their parents 
put them in a military school because they 
couldn't handle them otherwise. I was about 21 
years old. Some of these kids were bruisers; you 
didn't want to discipline them! 
I really wasn't terribly well prepared to be 
a teacher. When I got the job, I went back to 
University of Miami to take some teaching 
courses. But it didn't teach me very much about 
lesson plans, and the kffid of things that you 
really need. So I muddled along. The dean 
would evaluate me periodically, and sadly 
shake his head. 
When we got ready for the end of the fall 
semester and packed up the school to move it, 
I had to pack up my physics lab. When we got 
down to Florida just before Christmas, I had a 
week off. 
The big event of the summer of 1950 was 
the Korean War. I was in the Navy Reserves but 
I'd finished up a Reserve tour. I got a nice 
old-fashioned telegram which said would you 
like a job working for the Army. They offered 
me a GS-5 to work at Dugway Proving Ground 
in Utah. I didn't have a clue of what Dugway 
Proving Ground, Utah, was, but the GS-5 salary 
was around $3200 a year, which was consider-
ably more than I was makffig teaching. 
I found out that it was a chemical facility. 
After five years at Dugway, I decided I really 
wanted to do some graduate work. I had met 
some people from the Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Operations Research Office (ORO), which 
had been established in 1948 to provide an 
operational research capability to the Army. I 
had met a number of the ORO people who had 
come out to Dugway, because they were begin-
ning to do a major chemical study for the 
Army. I was very much impressed with them. 
After a set of interviews, I got a letter from 
the director, Ellis Johnson, the only director that 
ORO ever had. He invited me to join the staff. I 
came back to Washington in the fall of '56. 
That's when I got the title of operations analyst. 
There were about a 100 analysts working at 
ORO. All different kinds of folks: mathemati-
cians, physicists, engineers, biologists, agrono-
mists, psychologists, a couple of MDs. Quite a 
diversified staff, the mixed team concept, to the 
ninth degree. But everybody was called opera-
tions analyst. 
MR. SHELDON: Where were their offices 
located at the time? 
MR. VISCO: At that time, the main office 
was located at 7100 Connecticut A venue in 
Chevy Chase, Maryland. Prior to World War II, 
it was a girls finishing school, a very elegant 
school, and apparently it went broke, was sold 
for taxes. During the war, the 4-H Club took it 
over. After the war, building materials were in 
scarce supply and the place needed a lot of 
work. The Army was looking for a place to put 
ORO. 
ORO was first located at Fort McNair, the 
administrative offices. When it first started, it 
was called the General Research Office for a 
few months, and then took on the name, Oper-
ations Research Office. Ellis Johnson had his 
office at Fort McNair, but they knew that the 
place was temporary. 
So the Army went to the 4-H people and 
they said, look, let us rent this place from you 
for a few years, we'll guarantee that we'll im-
prove it somewhat, we'll put in some money to 
fix the floors so the safes won't drop through 
from the second floor to the ground floor. 
You'll get it back in no worse shape than it's in 
now and maybe a little better shape, and you'll 
have the money from the rent, and then build-
ing supplies will be more readily available. The 
4-H agreed. So ORO was located in what used 
to be a girls finishing school. 
They put me on a chemical study, a big 
study for ORO at the time, which had about 
eight or nine analysts. We also had a handful of 
soldiers that the Army assigned, professionally 
educated soldiers, to help out. 
We were located at the Science Building. 
The outer office in the Science Building where 
the secretaries for our project were located had 
a beautiful crystal chandelier. It had been the 
Domestic Science Building where the young 
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ladies learned to set a formal dining table under 
this beautiful crystal chandelier. 
As the staff expanded during the Korean 
War, we took over other rental sites in Bethesda 
and Chevy Chase, scattered all around. We had 
some chauffeured sedans that would run us 
around and do messenger service. We had a 
vacuum tube computer, 1103A Univac. It was 
located in a very large Quonset hut-shaped 
building, just a huge sheet metal building lo-
cated near the railroad tracks in Bethesda, 
Maryland. Trains were still running in those 
days, near what is now called the Air Rights 
Building in Bethesda. This enormous vacuum 
tube computer had to be shut down every sum-
mer because we couldn't cool the building well 
enough with the window air conditioners. 
Ellis Johnson decreed that all the analysts 
had to learn how to program. So we did the 
punch card business and the paper tape stuff. 
Your final exam was to write a program to 
compute the mean of five two-digit numbers. If 
you could do that, you passed the course! The 
vacuum tube thing was our computer for quite 
a long time. 
ORO also pioneered the train fire targeting 
system. Traditionally, soldiers were trained on 
what was known as a fixed-distance range. Go 
out and shoot at targets. Very boring for sol-
diers, and very impractical. It's got nothing to 
do with military operations. ORO came up with 
the idea of using pop-up targets, randomly dis-
tributed around a field. They developed a con-
cept called train fire, which the Army still uses 
to train its soldiers. They have these random 
things popping up. They used to be called 
cocky Kens, because one of the key guys doing 
the study was Ken Yudowitch, who had a fan-
tastic reputation as a womanizer. 
We also had an engineering lab. In it were 
down-to-earth, hard-working engineer types 
who built things. They could put together elec-
tronic gear. For example, on this pop-up target 
thing, one of the things you wanted was some 
way to determine which targe.t was being hit, 
kind of a precursor of the system we use out at 
the National Training System now. The NTC 
system is where you fire a laser at a target and 
the target lights up when it gets hit. Well, this 
was a precursor of that system. 
A lot of that stuff was built in the ORO 
laboratory. The guys would build things to 
help out the analysts who are going to go out in 
the field and do an experiment. 
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One summer, a bunch of analysts went out 
to Gettysburg, and there was a big debate as to 
what Pickett's charge really must have looked 
like. So they decided that they would start at 
that far end, and see how far they could run 
across that field. It turned out to be a major 
undertaking because it's got an uphill slope. It 
was a hot July day when Pickett and a couple of 
divisions made that wild charge. ORO used to 
do things like that, just to get a feel for what the 
operation's really like. 
In those days, ORO was really close to the 
Army and got out in the field. During the Ko-
rean War, which was before my time because I 
didn't get there till '56, about half the analysts 
at ORO spent time in Korea working in the 
field, doing all kinds of different studies. There 
was that long tradition of working closely with 
the field forces and the ground forces, to get a 
good understanding of Army problems. We've 
lost that in operations research now. 
After the chemical study in 1961, I began 
working on a very early version of a cost-effec-
tiveness study, a study that was pioneering for 
its time, trying to relate cost and effectiveness 
of big systems in the Army. We took on the 
future main battle tank, which later became the 
Ml. I worked for Eddie Cushen, and we tried to 
develop some mechanism for doing this kind of 
study, because nobody had ever done it before. 
MR. SHELDON: You're still at ORO doing 
thi ? s. 
MR. VISCO: ORO, still. We decided to use 
an early simulation, an early model called Car-
monette, which later became a much bigger 
model. At that time it was a small model with 
half a dozen tanks, some antitank weapons, and 
such. 
That was the way we were going to do the 
effectiveness side. Then we were going to build 
a cost model, to try to build a tank component 
by component. 
We were thinking of combined rocket 
launcher and internal projectile like the Shille-
lagh. We were thinking of diesel engines. We 
built it up by looking at cost data on existing 
systems and trying to do some projection. 
The study went on for a couple years, and 
ORO went out of business, some complications 
with the Army. The ORO ceased to exist on the 
31st of August 1961, and the Research Analysis 
Corporation (RAC) came into being on the first 
of September 1961. RAC was an Army not-for-
profit, free-standing institution. Johns Hopkins 
withdrew from the process. It was a political 
Page 71 
Page 72 
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT ... EUGENE P. VISCO, FS 
disagreement between the Army and the lead-
ership of ORO. 
I stayed on; a few people resigned in pro-
test, and went on doing other things. Eddie 
Cushen was one of those who resigned and 
went with Ellis Johnson out to Case Institute to 
do other research, and so I took over the study. 
We made runs with Carmonette, did some 
effectiveness measures, matching our tanks 
against Russian tanks, ran a whole series of 
runs, did our costing. Not a bad study when it 
was finished. But the thing that bothered us 
when we got all through with this calculation 
was, we could not believe that anyone in his 
right mind would pay that much for a tank. 
The M48 tank was the standard tank in the 
Army at the time, and the M60 was just coming 
in. The M60 cost about $100,000. This new tank 
was going to cost three-quarters of a million, 
and we couldn't believe that anybody in his 
right mind would pay that much for a tank. 
When we wrote the report, we emphasized the 
effectiveness side. We put the cost thing way in 
the back somewhere, because we thought it 
was an asinine number. 
If you take 1962 data, and you come for-
ward to present day, and you look at the price 
of the Ml, and you do the usual discounting, 
that three-quarters of a million is about what 
the Ml is costing, which is now a couple a 
million dollars, or more. 
RAC opened a field office in Germany in 
1962, and I got a chance to volunteer for that. 
We had a team of five analysts, headquartered 
in Stuttgart-Waingen, a suburb of Stuttgart in 
southern Germany. We were on a post that the 
U.S. Army calls Patch Barracks, named after 
General Patch from World War II. We were 
attached to the Army G-3, five analysts and a 
secretary. There were two senior and two mid-
dle grade analysts, and one youngster on the 
team. At that time U.S. Seventh Army consisted 
of five divisions in two corps: VII Corps and V 
Corps. V Corps was located just outside of 
Stuttgart; VII Corps was headquartered in 
Frankfurt. 
We also had two armored cavalry regi-
ments with Seventh Army, so it was a real field 
army. We also had the III German Corps at-
tached to the U.S. Seventh Army, so it was a 
three corps army. A lot of soldiers scattered all 
over southern Germany. The Brits had northern 
Germany. 
The first thing we did was to go out to visit 
all the divisions and cav regiments, talking to 
the senior staff, principally the G-2 and the 
commander, if we could get to him. We wanted 
to find out what kind of problems they saw 
themselves having in their sectors, and their 
role in NATO. Were there things that we might 
be able to help them with? We didn't have a 
work program. We were building one by talk-
ing to the units. 
We gathered these different ideas, came 
back in, and developed an analytic structure. 
What we tried to do was learn what these guys 
saw as their problems. 
Secondly, we asked ourselves was it some-
thing we could work on, given there were just 
the five of us with different capabilities? We 
could call on some help from home, but we felt 
we ought to be able to do most of it ourselves. 
Not only could we do it because we had the 
smarts-but could we do it in a relatively short 
period of time? 
So we looked at all of the different ideas 
and put them through this mill, and we came 
up with a priority listing. The top item on the 
list was the role of helicopters in the event of a 
major war in Europe. I forgot to preface this. In 
the first year of the Research Analysis Corpo-
ration's existence-from the fall of '61 to the 
summer of '62, the Army had begun a major 
study of the role of rotary wing aircraft in fu-
ture war. The study had been dictated by Sec-
retary of Defense McNamara. The Army was 
ordered to do it. The study leader was Hamil-
ton Howze, the commanding general of the 
XVIII Airborne Corps at that time. Therefore 
the study was headquartered at Fort Bragg, 
headquarters of the corps. But the study was 
being done by literally hundreds, if not thou-
sands of people. RAC was doing the study; 
RAND was doing pieces of it. SRI was doing 
pieces of it. The Army was doing a lot of pieces 
of it. 
They were doing experiments. They were 
doing trials. They were doing demonstrations. 
STAG (Studies Tactics and Analysis Group), 
the precursor of CAA, STAG was a war-gaming 
group, out in Bethesda, was working on it. 
Everybody was working on it. It was like what 
they're doing now with transformation studies. 
A lot of power was being vested in this. 
It was the winter/spring of '62. I was told 
to do a study on interdiction of supply lines in 
Southeast Asia from aircraft. This is before the 
war of course. The question was what could be 
done to interdict supply lines? 
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I was using the Russian IL-28 bomber, a 
light bomber, and I was using World War II 
calculations of the hit-kill probabilities from 
iron bombs on railroad tracks and bridges. It's 
very hard to destroy bridges and railroad 
tracks with iron bombs. It's very, very difficult. 
I wrote a paper on this, and then I was told 
to take it to Fort Bragg-this is early summer of 
'62-and brief the Howze board. The board 
was a very prestigious group. They would lis-
ten to all this stuff and do some kind of syn-
thesis. I'm assuming I'm going down to Fort 
Bragg in the morning and coming back in the 
afternoon. I just take an overnight bag. The 
board is working out of the high school in Fort 
Bragg, which is the only air conditioned build-
ing in Bragg at the time. I report in, and find an 
old friend, Harold Linstone. Hal was working 
for Howze directly, and he was doing the syn-
thesis of all of the stuff coming. And Hal says, 
"You know why you're here?" 
I said, "Yes, I'm going to talk about this 
interdiction study." "No," he said, "you're here 
to work with me." So I had to go out and buy 
pants and shirts. I stayed for the summer work-
ing with Hal, trying to synthesize what was 
coming in from all these trials and these tests. 
With that in mind, we return to Germany. 
The high priority study that the field Army 
people want is how our helicopters are going to 
be used. We put together a priority listing. We 
went across the street to meet the commanding 
general of Seventh Army, Bill Quinn. We get an 
audience with him, and our team leader Joe 
Bruner (very good analyst) gives him this brief-
ing-how we did all this work program and 
what the priority projects are. And Gen. Quinn 
leans back in his chair and he said, "You guys 
can do whatever you want to do," he said, "but 
I know what I'm going to do with my choppers, 
and no study is going to change my mind." 
So we saluted smartly and said, "Yes, sir." 
The study gets scratched off the list because if 
the commanding general doesn't want it, if he 
knows already what he's going to do with his 
stuff, then we're not about to do a study with 
our limited resources. 
So we did a handful of logistics studies. 
There'd been a big debate in NA TO about the 
adequacy of the pre-positioned equipment. The 
United States Army had put two division loads 
of armored equipment in France. France had 
not left the military side of the alliance yet. The 
idea was in the event of a war, we were going 
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to fly soldiers over to marry up with their 
equipment and they would take the field. 
The other NATO nations said that's cra-
zy-it won't work McNamara said let's show 
them that it'll work So in the fall of 1963, after 
the Germans had harvested all their crops, be-
cause we were going to go across the fields, we 
ran the largest exercise that had ever been run 
in Germany, before and since, as far as I know. 
We had two divisions in the field from the 
Seventh Army, one attacker and one defender. 
We ran the battle north and south so the Rus-
sians wouldn't get nervous about the exercise 
as they might if we ran it east and west. 
We had an invading division coming out 
the north, a division from Seventh Army de-
fending. We flew the 2nd Armored Division 
over from Fort Hood to Erance, married up 
with their equipment, marched through France 
up into Germany, passed through-I think it 
was the 8th Infantry that was doing the defend-
ing-passed through them and fought off the 
aggressor. An enormous exercise. 
I was trying to build a simple hand-played 
war game for Central Army Group to use, prin-
cipally for exercises, but also to help them think 
through operational plans. I wanted something 
a little more objective than the usual umpire 
stuff that we'd done for command post exer-
cises. 
I needed some factors. The VII Corps com-
mander was going to be the exercise director on 
this big operation, and his name was Creighton 
Abrams, later commander in Vietnam, and 
later still, Chief of Staff; a good tanker from 
World War II. 
So I went up to him, up in his Corps head-
quarters in the LG. Farben Building, and I gave 
him a pitch. I said, "Sir, I'm trying to build this 
game, blah, blah, blah, and I'd like your per-
mission to cover the exercise as an umpire but 
not play the role. But I'd like to be able to go 
back and forth on both sides." He said, "Sure; 
sounds great; do it." 
It was very nice of him. So I spent the two 
weeks of the exercise with a jeep, and a driver, 
roaming the whole battlefield, making little 
notes on how fast units could move, and what 
they were shooting at. We didn't have any way 
of calculating casualties because we didn't have 
any of the fancy devices. It was great fun. 
I was able to gather a lot of bits and pieces 
of statistics that I could stick into my game, to 
make it a little more realistic. I built the game 
using those factors as well as some other things. 
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I went around and talked to different units 
about their role. 
A little sidelight. We had something called 
special ammunition supply points. These were 
people who handled the tactical nuclear weap-
ons. When a war started, they were supposed 
to pick up from wherever they were and go to 
a pre-designed location, a location known to 
the field units. Because when they fired off the 
basic load weapons, they'd have to come back 
to the special ammunition supply point to be 
re-supplied. I wanted to know how long it 
would take the special ammunition supply 
point unit to move from its kasern to its first 
battle location. I had to talk to a commander of 
the unit and find out how long it would take 
them to move up. 
I wrote up this little game. It had a bunch of 
nomograms in it, look-up tables, and it was 
designed so that you could calculate a day's 
operation of about 15 divisions on a side in 
about an hour, just running the calculations 
out. It had all kinds of calculations of nuclear 
weapons' effects and other kinds of effects, to 
calculate casualties and then from the basis of 
casualties to calculate movement. These were 
the old things that we thought were important: 
attrition and the movement of the forward line. 
We used it on a couple of exercises to match 
what the umpires ·were doing, and to make 
some comparisons. I got intelligence data on 
the locations in East Germany and Poland of all 
of the logistics facilities. The petroleum, oil, and 
lubricant, the POL facilities, the ammunition-
everything we had in the intelligence structure, 
and I put in the eight digit coordinates of all 
these targets in my game. And so my game 
became Top Secret because all these targets 
were located. 
But the game part itself had a lower classi-
fication, so we were able to separate out the 
appendix. That was the big thing I left behind at 
Seventh Army when I came back to the States 
in '64. 
Back to my days with Seventh Army, 1962 
to 1964, I left out a particular study that I got 
involved in early on. When I first got to Europe, 
it was October of 1962. (Matter of fact we were 
at sea, en route to Europe during the Cuban 
missile crisis, and to some degree, we were 
concerned as to whether we might go to war, 
and the ship we were on, which was a French 
ship, might be attacked and sunk.) An event 
occurred in the fall of '62. The Armalite rifle, 
which was then called the AR 15, which was a 
sporting rifle, a smaller caliber than the Ml4, 
which was the standard U.S. Army rifle, had 
come to the attention of some people in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
The reputation of the Armalite was that it 
had tremendous casualty-producing capability 
even though the projectile was smaller than the 
.30 caliber or a 7.62 mm, which is a metric 
equivalent of .30 caliber. 
The folks in the Office of Secretary of De-
fense, in Alain Enthoven's analytic group, felt 
that the Armalite rifle would make an admira-
ble weapon for what was beginning to turn into 
a war in Vietnam. The Kennedy administration 
was beginning to think about sending over 
some advisers. 
The Army was deeply concerned about the 
ARIS. Although the weapon itself was of some 
interest, the Army was satisfied that the Ml 4 
was a fine rifle. The OSD people were pressur-
ing the Army to take on the Armalite and make 
it the standard infantryman's weapon, so that 
we could buy more of them and ship them to 
the Vietnamese for them to use. 
The Army resisted on a couple of grounds. 
One was bureaucratic, which was that we had 
an agreement with NATO to have a standard 
round, the 7.62, or .30 caliber round, and all the 
NATO nations had agreed. If you went to the 
smaller caliber, in the Armalite (whatever it 
might be called) that would violate that agree-
ment that we had with NATO. 
OSD people said the agreement was not all 
that important, and besides there was no dem-
onstration that NATO ammunition could be 
used by the M14. So the Army was directed by 
OSD to do two things. One, to examine whether 
or not NATO ammunition could in fact be han-
dled by the M14, and, secondly, to run a series 
of field operations in which they gave Ar-
malites to infantry soldiers in different parts of 
the world, have them go to the field, to see how 
it might fare in a field exercise. The Army was 
directed to do this in different climates. I forget 
where the cold weather thing was done, but 
Panama was the hot weather one. 
We were also directed to run a test in Ger-
many, the only place you could get the NATO 
ammunition, to examine whether or not NATO 
ammunition could be fired by the M14. I was 
given this experiment to run. I was given a 
platoon of soldiers. At that time we had some-
thing called the Rota Plan. We rotated battle 
groups from stateside locations, attached them 
to divisions in Germany in the Seventh Army, 
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and they would replace a group that would 
come to the States, on 90-day rotations. 
So I had a platoon from a Roto Plan group. 
We went up to Baumholder in Germany. 
Baumholder is an extremely unpleasant place 
to be, most of the time. This was in November, 
and the weather was pretty miserable-raw, 
gray clouds all the time, lots of overcast, and it 
was the week before Thanksgiving. 
At that time, the Army was still using the 
known distance range thing, so we had a very 
boring situation for this platoon of soldiers, 
because only about ten or twelve of them could 
be on the firing line at any one time. The others 
were lolling around, waiting for an opportu-
nity. 
I had ammunition from the French, British, 
Germans, Canadians, and the U.S. I had five 
different countries' ammunition, all purporting 
to be NATO standard ammunition. The way I 
ran the trials, or the experiment, or demonstra-
tion-was I had armorers standing behind the 
line loading the clips for the Ml4 as we were 
firing-the Ml4-so that the shooter didn't 
know which ammunition he was getting. 
It was a blind test, in case the shooter's 
behavior might change if he knew what kind of 
ammunition he was firing. One sidelight was 
when we broke open the boxes of Canadian 
ammunition, we discovered that it was U.S. 
ammunition manufactured in St. Louis but re-
packaged for Canadian operations, because Ca-
nadians use a plastic bandoleer. So that's how 
the boxes were packed, with these bandoleers. 
So we really were firing two batches of U.S. 
ammunition plus German, French, and British. 
The measure of performance was to be the 
number of stoppages that were due to ammu-
nition. 
The soldiers fired thousands of rounds of 
ammunition. There's a way to set the M14 on 
automatic fire. So we had automatic fire as well 
as single, repeating rounds. Those youngsters 
fired more ammunition in those few days than 
they had ever fired in their lives, or ever would. 
Literally, thousands. I tried to gather data on 
the hit distributions as well because they were 
shooting at targets, and the targets were being 
marked, and I tried to collect some data to see 
whether or not the different ammunition was 
behaving differently. 
I wasn't able to do a very good job with hit 
probabilities. I collected the targets afterwards 
and tried to do some analysis, but it was well 
beyond me, I mean, just the quantity of it. My 
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crude observation was that as far as hits were 
concerned, there wasn't any difference. 
What was significant was that there was 
not a single stoppage that could be connected 
with ammunition. There were stoppages and as 
soon as a soldier had a jam, or a stoppage, he 
immediately put his weapon down, and we 
had an armorer pick up the weapon, take it 
back of the line, and clear the jam, and deter-
mine what caused the jam. All the jams were 
caused by soldiers' failure to keep the weapon 
clean. 
There was never a single stoppage from 
these thousands of rounds of ammunition, and 
of course that's the report that went in. We also 
took that same platoon and gave half of them 
AR15s and the other half had their Ml4s, and 
they went out into the field .from Baumholder 
for two or three days. The soldiers swapped the 
weapons, so we evened out the behavior char-
acteristics of individual soldiers. They ran 
around out in the woods, and fell down on the 
ground, and used the weapon-when they 
jumped into a firing position on the ground, 
you used the weapon to stop your fall. 
The only problem we had was that the 
AR15s, which were not militarized, suffered 
very badly under those conditions. But that was 
a minor point. 
The downside for the soldiers was that the 
week that they took the field was Thanksgiving 
week, so they marched out at Thanksgiving 
time. I was blamed-I didn't stay, by the way, 
for that part of it. As soon as my firing stuff was 
over, I went back to Stuttgart where my office 
was, and we wrote up the report, and shipped 
it in, and we clearly had demonstrated that 
NATO ammunition could in fact be fired 
through the Ml 4. 
But it made absolutely no difference, be-
cause shortly thereafter, the Army was forced 
into giving up the Ml 4 and to release contracts 
to the Armalite Company to make a military 
version of the AR15, which became the Ml6, 
now the standard rifle. So we have a U.S. rifle 
in NATO that doesn't fire NATO ammunition 
anymore. That's that story. 
The next big· adventure was the Vietnam 
War. The Vietnam War was just beginning. The 
advisers had gone in '63, and our first adviser 
death was in '63. It was beginning to look like 
it'd be more exciting, more important than any-
one expected, and I kept talking to the RAC 
management about sending a team in Vietnam 
to work with the troops. 
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At that time RAC was trying to build a 
different image for itself, and it wanted to op-
erate at a higher level, a strategic level. They 
were interested in not only doing work for the 
Army but also doing work for the Defense De-
partment, moving out of the old traditional 
roles. 
I had a falling out with the management 
over that. In '66, a friend of mine working for a 
firm that had a contract with Combat Develop-
ments Command, which is the precursor to 
what is now TRADOC (Training and Doctrine 
Command). Combat Developments Command 
dealt principally with doctrine. Training was 
done by another command, the Continental 
Army Command. 
Combat Developments Command had a 
contract with a small group called the Combat 
Operations Research Group, or CORG, which 
was a subdivision of a company called Techni-
cal Operations Incorporated. They were located 
at Fort Belvoir, where the Combat Develop-
ments Command had moved. 
My friend was now running the Combat 
Operations Research Group. He called me up 
and said, "How would you like to take a team 
to Vietnam?" And I said, "I'd love to take a 
team to Vietnam." I departed RAC on friendly 
terms, but the reason was over this issue of not 
going where the troops are. I took a team of half 
a dozen civilians, accompanying a team of a 100 
officers, to go over and do a study of mecha-
nized and armored combat operations in Viet-
nam. 
We got over there in January '67. The Army 
had sent a team over the year before to do a 
study of infantry operations. One of the junior 
analysts on that team was E.B. Vandiver. That's 
a very junior analyst. E.B. was working for 
Combat Operations Research Group when I 
joined them. I was senior to him because I was 
older; he was just a kid at the time. I found out, 
not too long ago, that he hated my guts because 
I got the team to go on the MACOV (for Mech-
anized and Armor Combat Operations, Viet-
nam) Project in '67, and he wanted that team, 
but he was not senior enough to be given the 
team, and for 20 years or 30 years, he's hated 
my guts (not seriously, though). 
So we went over to Vietnam. We were lo-
cated in a compound in Saigon, and the officers 
fanned out into the countryside. We had data 
collection forms. They were collecting informa-
tion on how M48 tanks and M 113 armored 
personnel carriers were being used. The M 113s 
were being used as fighting vehicles. 
They had put some weapons on them. They 
already had a machine gun but they added 
some grenade launchers. They put a lot of sand-
bags in the bottom to prevent mines from de-
stroying the bottom, and they were being used 
as fighting vehicles. 
We contacted the units using them to find 
out how they were using them, how effective 
they seemed to be. Did their experience imply 
anything for future, either future design, future 
operations, or future doctrine, for fighting that 
kind of a war with armored vehicles? 
My civilians were not permitted to go out 
in the countryside. The general who com-
manded the study didn't particularly care for 
civilians and didn't care for me. I did get out a 
little bit. I went out with the general a couple of 
times into the Delta, and a few other places, 
but, by and large, we were stuck in the com-
pound. 
Each of my civilians were experts in partic-
ular areas. One was a logistician, another a 
weapons guy, and so on. I worked with a small 
team of officers to do the synthesis. The officer 
team consisted of: a brand new colonel named 
Donn Starry who later became a four-star, and 
the TRADOC commander. He also later com-
manded the Armor Center and the Armor 
School. A Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton 
III, who also has a reputation, and there was 
another armor officer. We were the synthesis 
group in the study and we were in a little 
cubbyhole of a room, and armor officers have 
to smoke cigars-it's required by law-and we 
had a little air conditioner pumping away, but 
that room got to be awful foul. 
But the study was exciting. We were there. a 
few months. When I got back to the States, I 
was persona non grata with the Army because of 
my conflict with the general, and, to some de-
gree, with George the Third. 
The first thing I did when I came back was 
I was asked by the Combat Developments 
Command, the very people who gave me a 
hard time later on, to write the command posi-
tion on the MACOV report. And I said, "But I 
wrote the MACOV report, how can I write the 
command position?" They said you're admira-
bly suited to write the command position. So I 
had to criticize my own work I did have a 
feeling that my career might have been dam-
aged because of this personality conflict. So I 
had to think about what my future was going to 
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look like. I talked to some friends on the Army 
staff. They looked into it, and they said we'd be 
happy to have you come to work for us, if you 
want. 
They offered me a job, but instead I went to 
work for a friend of mine, George Milly, who 
used to run the Chemical Corps Operations 
Research Group. He had formed a little com-
pany to do not only military analysis but also 
environmental stuff. I thought I'd work in a real 
private sector job. I went to work for him in '68. 
And I recruited Joanne Langston (now a senior 
civilian faculty member at the Defense Systems 
Management College). I recruited her to come 
to work at GEOMET, a little company out in 
Rockville, and the first study we did for De-
fense Department was a chemical study. 
We wrote a series of papers that were com-
piled into a big source book on everything that 
was known about chemicals and chemical 
weapons. The Army (or the Defense Depart-
ment) then picked it up and continued updat-
ing it. 
Then I did a study on the first nonmilitary 
thing I think I ever did, after all these years. It 
was a study on the effectiveness of community 
health centers, a pilot program of Johnson's 
War on Poverty and the Office of Economic 
Opportunity. Joann Langston chaired the 
study. It was an interesting study that had 
some impact, subsequently, on that part of the 
War on Poverty program. 
I did some other work during that same 
time on publicly provided family planning ser-
vices. Did that mostly through GEO MET. 
After a few years at GEOMET, I had an 
opportunity to join a small black-owned com-
pany in Washington called the National Insti-
tute for Community Development, located in 
downtown Washington. I was brought in to 
form a quantitative analytk group, to help 
them get some contracts. 
They were basically a soft analytical com-
pany. They were mostly members from the For-
eign Service or USAID, and they were doing a 
lot of touchy-feely things. We did some studies 
for Health, Education and Welfare. Some were 
on drug abuse prevention. I did more work on 
family planning again, some innovative stuff 
having to do with trying to bring young men 
into the family planning decision process, fo-
cusing on young men's relationships with 
young women. 
About this time, I got interested in the mas-
ter's program at University of Southern Califor-
Military Operations Research, V6 N2 2001 
nia, in Washington, in their School of Public 
Affairs. I did a master's in public administra-
tion and policy analysis. It was a very interest-
ing program. 
About that time, because I got interested in 
this policy arena, I decided that I would like to 
get back to a place where I might have some 
influence on policy. I argued to myself that you 
could do that better from inside the Govern-
ment, and so I began scouting around for a 
Government job. 
Well, I benefited from a strange anomaly in 
the Civil Service structure. I had resigned from 
Civil Service when I was working at Dugway, 
back in 1956. Because I had been a permanent 
civil servant out there, I had status. Twenty-
three years out of Federal service, but I still had 
status. 
A friend of mine was working in a little-
known agency, the United States Metric Board. 
In 1975, the Congress passed a law called the 
Metric Conversion Act of 1975, and one unique 
characteristic of the Metric Conversion Act was 
that it denied to the Federal Government the 
option of converting to the metric system. The 
Federal Government was supposed to follow 
the private sector. The Metric Board was a pres-
identially-appointed, senatorially-approved 
body of 17 or 18 public citizens, chosen to rep-
resent different sectors of the society-the en-
gineering community, the education commu-
nity, labor, small business, big business. These 
board members were to coordinate the volun-
tary conversion to the metric system. And if 
you can imagine coordinating a voluntary pro-
cess, it's kind of difficult. 
The board went around the country hold-
ing hearings, listening to citizens complain or 
advocate conversion to the metric system. The 
board was supported by about 35 Civil Service 
staff, one of the smallest federal agencies ever 
to exist, but very high up on the hierarchy 
because we reported both to the White House 
and to the Congress. 
It had a three-person research group and an 
annual contract budget of $200,000. The agen-
cy's budget was $3 million for the whole 
agency. I was hired as one of the three-person 
research group. Our job was to try to determine 
the impact of private sector conversion on seg-
ments of U.S. society. 
In 1980 Ronald Reagan was elected Presi-
dent and we know, traditionally, that the in-
coming President cannot affect the budget that 
year. He has to live with the budget, the pre-
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decessor budget. But Reagan's Director of OMB 
found the United States Metric Board was there 
for $3 million, and he said, "What in the devil is 
this?" and wiped it out, just like that. 
When they close out, federal agencies are 
supposed to close out in the black, if at all 
possible. And since we were nothing but peo-
ple, the idea was to try to get those people jobs. 
The board was desperate to get rid of people, to 
get them other jobs as quickly as possible. 
Joanne Langston-she had worked with me at 
GEOMET-was in Government now and she 
was working with the Chief of Staff of the 
Army. She had an office called the Study Pro-
gram Management Office. 
She picked me up to help develop an eval-
uation plan for the Army Study Program. The 
Army Study Program was basically the opera-
tions analysis that was going on throughout the 
whole Army. I started working with Joanne's 
office on the detail, and later was hired on 
directly. So that's how I got back into the Pen-
tagon. 
Joanne sent me up to Harvard for what 
Harvard called the senior officials in national 
security, eight week program. She also pushed 
me to apply for the National War College, 
which I did, and I was the Army civilian se-
lectee in 1986 to go to the National War College 
at Fort McNair. 
The spring of 1987 was when the Goldwa-
ter-Nickles Act was implemented, and there 
was a lot of reorganization of the Army staff, in 
particular, as well as the Air Force staff and 
Navy staff. When the smoke cleared, Joanne's 
group was no longer working for the Chief of 
Staff of the Army. 
Her group was now working for Walt Hol-
lis, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for 
Operations Research. I was still at National War 
College, graduating in June. I went over to see 
Walt. I had known him a little bit, through 
contacts when I was working for Joanne. I had 
an interview with him, and we were chatting 
about what I should do. I had become Joanne's 
deputy, but under this organization, there was 
really no requirement for a deputy. So Walt 
said, 11What do you want to do?" and I said, 
11Well, I'd like to get back to doing some anal-
ysis, and if it's all the same with you, I'd like to 
do analysis in your group." He had a small 
group of analysts. 
And he said, "That's good, because that's 
what I want you to do, too." When I graduated, 
I went right to work for Walt, and he was very 
kind to me. Most of his analysts are given sys-
tems to track for him. Part of his responsibility 
was in the acquisition arena, acquisition and 
evaluation-analysis-testing business. He's got 
four or five civilian analysts and two or three 
military analysts, and each one of them has a 
hardware sector to deal with. 
One of them deals with armor. Another one 
deals with air defense. Another deals with ar-
tillery, or different sets of equipment, and it's 
their job to stay ahead on whatever's going on 
in those areas, to make sure that Walt's aware 
of what's going on. 
With me, he said, "What is it you would 
like to work on?" and I said, "Well, I'm not 
really hardware systems-oriented. I'd like to 
work on some software arenas, fuzzier arenas, 
if that's okay with you," and he said, 11Yeah, 
that's good." 
So I got back into the chemical/biological 
stuff a little bit, mostly in the casualty arena. I 
became his representative to MORS, and I was 
the Army representative for ten years with 
MORS. 
Eventually, when things like operations 
other than war came along, as a topic, I became 
his guy on operations other than war. As I said 
before, I've dealt a lot with the casualty stuff. I 
used to sit on something called the Casualty 
Estimation Steering Committee. The Deputy 
Chief of Staff of Personnel was responsible for 
casualty assessment in the Army, and it was 
exploring how casualties should be estimated. 
The board itself was a collection of staff 
people, and they looked for things to help es-
tablish some predictions that the Army could 
deal with. The predictions the Army had in 
most of its doctrinal documents were extrapo-
lations from World War II and Korea, and, 
clearly, weapons were changing and concepts 
of operation were changing. 
A lot of the war games were doing a poor 
job of determining casualties. So there was in-
terest in casualty assessment, and I spent a lot 
of time with them. 
You asked about my involvement with the 
Brits. When I was working for the Seventh 
Army in Germany, we had visited the Army 
Operational Research Group, which was the 
British group located at West Byfleet in En-
gland, a group that had come out of World War 
II and was still operating, although somewhat 
larger, and doing broader things. 
One of the people I had met was Ronnie 
Shephard, who was a very good analyst, got his 
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start in 1942 when he graduated from Cam-
bridge, and immediately went to work in the 
British tank business, and he stayed in that 
business as an analyst, from 1942 on. 
When I met him in 1963, he was pioneering 
some war-gaming stuff, doing table games, but 
using them to help think through weapons con-
figurations and other things. Some very cre-
ative stuff. We became friends. 
When I was working for Walt, I came 
across Ronnie again. He was now retired from 
British civil service and working as a consultant 
to Royal Ordnance, which was like a govern-
ment corporation but it did private business as 
well. He was also doing some consulting back 
here in the States. 
Some years earlier, Ronnie had started run-
ning an international meeting. NATO used to 
run a series of symposia in operations research, 
and NATO used to have something called the 
Advisory Panel on Operational Research, 
APOR. Back about 18 or 19 years ago, NATO 
pleaded lack of funds, and they dosed out the 
Advisory Panel on Operational Research. Since 
they no longer ran these international sympo-
sia, Ronnie Shephard stepped in and filled that 
gap, and he said there's got to be an interna-
tional meeting of military operations analysts. 
He organized his own, and, eventually, it got to 
be called the International Symposium on Mil-
itary Operational Research. It was carried out at 
the Royal Military College of Science, Shriven-
ham, which is equivalent to our AFIT and Navy 
Postgraduate School, but shorter programs. 
Ronnie had been teaching operations re-
search at the Royal Military College of Science. 
So it was a natural to start having the symposia 
there. I started going to those symposia, maybe 
the sixth or seventh one, and I've gone to them 
ever since. After the tenth symposium, Ronnie 
was worried about what was going to happen 
to these symposia when he was no longer 
around. So he got the U .K. Ministry of Defense 
to agree to lend its name, and a small amount of 
money. He got the Ministry of Defense to es-
tablish a three-person committee to plan and 
continue running what we now call the ISMOR. 
Ministry of Defense agreed to establish a three-
person committee, Ronnie Shephard, David 
Paddy, who was another old-time analyst, and 
myself, because the U.S. was the next major 
country involved in these symposia. 
At the meetings, you'd generally have 40 
percent Brits, 30 percent Americans, and some 
French, German, Norwegians, Swiss, Singa-
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poreans, Turks. Most recently, we even had 
some folks from Eastern Europe. 
When Ronnie passed away, I took over the 
U.S. side. With Walt Hollis's help, I manage an 
American mailing list of about 300 people. We 
have the meeting in late August. This past Au-
gust, we had the 17th symposium but for the 
first time not at the Royal Military College of 
Science but rather at a conference center near 
Oxford. 
We invite people. We send out announce-
ments. People read papers. It's like MORS but 
not classified, and truly international. It's a 
four-day meeting. We have a half day trip to 
Oxford, to go to the bookstores or the pubs. 
And I continue to have connections with folks 
working in the OR business, the chemical/bio-
logical business, and in Porton in England. 
Now that I'm retired, I'm doing some inde-
pendent stuff. I teach a course at George Mason 
on the history of operations during the war. I'm 
trying to write some books on different things. 
But I'm basically lazy and I don't want to work 
too hard! 
MR. SHELDON: How do you feel about 
the state of operations research as a profession 
today? 
MR. VISCO: I've had a deep concern about 
the emphasis on digital models for a long time. 
I was quite concerned, even up to a couple of 
decades ago, I began getting particularly un-
comfortable because we were having great 
trouble validating the models, and we were 
trying to brush off the fact that we couldn't 
validate them, by making all kinds of excuses 
for ourselves. 
I went back and I looked, historically, at 
how we got into this situation, and wrote a 
paper on this. I gave a keynote address at the 
first Cornwallis meeting up in Nova Scotia five 
years ago to discuss it. 
In the early days, when we first started out 
in military operations research, post World War 
II, operations research in this country, when it 
really began to burgeon, we began looking at 
ways to emulate or simulate military opera-
tions, and we began exploring computer mod-
els. I remember at ORO we had an analog com-
puter that we were using to simulate battle-
very primitive. We actually built analog 
computers using resistances to represent be-
havior of forces. 
I think the first piece of work done on a 
digital model was in 1955, by Dick Zimmer-
man, who built the first combat model at ORO. 
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It ran on a vacuum tube machine, so it was a 
very small model. We wouldn't even run it on 
the 1103 Univac that we had. We had to go to a 
contractor that had a somewhat bigger vacuum 
tube machine. 
Dick's argument was that you had to un-
derstand all the relationships that you were 
working with on the battlefield. You had to 
have closed form equations of all these interac-
tions, and you would use the digital computer 
only when the number of computations got to 
be onerous. You couldn't do them by hand. So 
you had to really understand what you were 
doing. His paper on Monte Carlo modeling of 
combat, which was published by Johns Hop-
kins Press in 1956, won the Lanchester Prize 
from the Operations Research Society of Amer-
ica that year. 
That model later became known as Car-
monette. Carmonette is the words Monte Carlo 
turned around. That's where we got the name 
Carmonette from. 
I think what happened was that as long as 
we were in the vacuum tube days, we were 
going to struggle with these small models. 
When the transistor was invented, computers 
got a little bit smaller. You could run them in 
the summertime now because you didn't have 
the heat loads. Programming became a little 
easier, and running runs, they could be done a 
little quicker than you could do them on the 
vacuum tube machine. People said, "Oh, wow, 
that's great. We don't have to limit ourselves to 
the 20 or 30 entities that Dick Zimmerman was 
limited to. We can now talk about lots of enti-
ties because we can write the programs faster. 
Even though we don't clearly understand these 
interrelationships, we can still go ahead and 
write the programs, and then go ahead." 
And then a short time later, the printed 
circuit came along, and then, God forbid, a few 
years later, the chip. And I think what hap-
pened was people were seduced by the com-
puters, and we jumped into large-scale model-
ing of combat, without clearly understanding 
all of the interactions and all the synergisms 
that go on the battlefield. And I think had we 
done what Dick had recommended back in 
1955, that we proceed very cautiously until we 
understand all those interrelationships, we'd be 
in a different place. 
Back to your question. I deplore what has 
happened with the models. I know that there's 
no way of turning that around now. It's impos-
sible. I have to convince people that this may be 
not the right direction to have gone in. 
It's unfortunate that we have gotten to the 
point where modeling and simulation, or M&S, 
are words in their own right. People don't 
make the distinction between models and sim-
ulation, or if there is no distinction, why do we 
use both words? I would like to see analysts get 
back to the fundamentals of military opera-
tions, and get a better feel for what really goes 
on in combat and out of combat, if you're trying 
to analyze those things. It's not a good thing 
that a large number of our analysts, particularly 
younger analysts, don't really know very much 
about military operations. 
I'll just wind it up by saying again why I 
thought we had made some basic errors, early 
on. I felt that in using our fundamental analytic 
tool, which now are digital computer models, 
we had made some errors in the early days and 
were suffering the effects of that now. Because 
we have not done a good job of understanding 
combat, we can't replicate it very well on com-
puters. That is why we have such great diffi-
culty in validating models today. I don't believe 
any combat model can be properly validated. 
I talked about what I thought was a major 
failing in military operations research, which is 
excessive dependency on digital models. 
There's no way to tum that ship around, except 
maybe to keep arguing that there are other 
kinds of analyses that need to be done. Old-
fashioned war gaming may be an approach that 
might make some sense to revisit. 
Advice to young analysts? The biggest dif-
ficulty I see, now, with young analysts, is a lack 
of a sense of what military life and military 
behavior is really all about. Even, to some ex-
tent, what military equipment is all about. We 
have a number of analysts coming in, coming 
straight out of graduate school, with no mili-
tary experience. Although we've had some 
wars, we're not seeing any analysts coming out 
of those experiences. 
Young analysts need to know that our job is 
really to see to it that young folks in the military 
will be sent out in harm's way-to use the 
Navy term. We send out young people to be at 
risk, to be hurt, to be killed in some cases, to 
defend the nation, and to carry out other mis-
sions for the nation. We need to have an ethic 
that says we're not doing casual kinds of anal-
yses. We're doing analyses that affect the life 
and death of young people. We want them to 
have the best opportunity to come through 
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whatever military operations they have to carry 
out with a high probability that they're going to 
come home safe, with all their limbs. 
Young analysts need to get more ac-
quainted with military life. I know that's hard 
to do, but some organizations do a better job 
than others. Some of the Army analytic groups 
have what they call the "greening" of young 
analysts, where they actually try to put young 
analysts with soldiers, on occasion, even going 
out on exercises. 
I'm urging young analysts to push for more 
of that, to get them out with the soldiers, the 
sailors, the airmen, and the marines, so they get 
to know more about what that life is all about. 
I have a Latin phrase that I attach to my 
e-mail, which is the motto of the Royal Society 
in England, and it is Nullius in Verba, which 
means something like the word is nothing, or 
the word is nil. The interpretation of that is 
don't accept words that you haven't validated 
yourself. Make sure that you really understand 
what somebody has done, either experimen-
tally, or analytically, and try to reproduce that 
yourself, if at all possible. 
Now I realize that's impossible for lots of 
things, but constantly test the words of others 
to satisfy yourself that they are as good as 
possible. As a closing note, I would paraphrase 
Blackett, who is seen as, if not the father, cer-
tainly one of the fathers of military operations 
research. Blackett had a philosophy which goes 
something like this. When you are providing 
advice to military officials, senior people, rec-
ommendations, ask yourself if you were in the 
position of authority, responsibility, would you 
in fact act the way you are suggesting these 
people should act. Put yourself in their shoes, 
to test out whether or not you really feel that 
confident about your own work and the contri-
bution you're making to national security. 
MR. SHELDON: Your interest in studying 
history, where does that come from? 
MR. VISCO: That's an additional piece of 
advice that I would give. It is important to 
understand military history and to read a lot of 
military history. That's advice that's often 
given to military officers, and people that are 
concerned with the military life. But I would 
also give it to military analysts: read a lot of 
military history. Find out the value you can get 
from reading history, and how it will influence 
your analysis. 
You don't want to spend all your time on 
military history. Especially since humans have 
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written military history, it's fallible in its own 
right. Multiple historians can look at the same 
operation and interpret things differently. But if 
you read lots of history, you'll get a flavor of 
that, and reading the history will also give you 
an appreciation of military life, and dangers, 
and the things that can go wrong on the battle-
field, or in the air, or at sea. 
My use of the military history, of opera-
tions other than war, is simply the fact that 
we've carried out a lot of such operations in our 
U.S. history, and I felt that there was something 
to be gained by getting a better understanding 
of the earlier operations and looking at differ-
ences between old operations, the first 150 
years of U.S. history versus the more recent 
operations in the last 50 years-how have 
things changed, and what our.military is called 
upon to do, in addition to fighting and defend-
ing the nation by going to war, or fighting off 
enemies, carrying out policy. 
The fact is that military people have done 
lots and lots of things other than fight, and 
history bears that out. So looking at history, 
looking at the historical events, and trying to 
figure out a way to gain knowledge from those 
historical events is what I've been doing re-
cently, and, hopefully, have a paper published 
one of these days. 
MR. SHELDON: What piqued your inter-
est in the Buffalo Soldiers? 
MR. VISCO: Well, as part of this looking at 
the history of operations other than war, I got 
acquainted with a lot of the domestic opera-
tions that had been carried out by military 
forces, some not so pleasant, like strike break-
ing, and things like that. 
It came to my attention that the soldiers on 
the frontier, particularly after the Civil War, 
there were two black cavalry regiments formed 
by an act of Congress, and also four infantry, 
black infantry, regiments of black soldiers, in-
fantry ones, which were later folded into two 
regiments when they did a drawdown. 
So we had two cavalry regiments and two 
infantry regiments of black soldiers. I discov-
ered that, in looking at operations other than 
war, that these soldiers carried out a lot of 
things-surveying, protecting the railroad 
builders, protecting settlers, running miners off 
of Indian reservations, which was supposed to 
be banned, to whites doing mining, or hunting. 
And the two black regiments, Ninth and 
Tenth Cav, were left on the frontier from about 
1867, when they were formed up enough to 
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take the field, until about 1892, when the Indian 
Wars ended. 
So they had a lot of experience on the fron-
tier. They chased bandits, cattle rustlers, they 
supported local sheriffs. So I got vastly inter-
ested in their performance, and, by the way, 
they performed magnificently, had very low 
rates of desertion, very low rates of drunken-
ness, very low rates of courts-martial, much 
lower than the famous Seventh Cav, for exam-
ple. A badly neglected part of U.S. history. 
I also discovered that the regiments very 
rarely were ever together as regiments. They 
were scattered over thousands of miles of West-
ern territory in small camps, and posts, and 
stations. You had company size units all over 
the place. They were called companies for 
many years. In the latter part of the 19th Cen-
tury, they were called troops. 
I discovered that the Ninth and Tenth Cav 
units had been, at various times, at 50 different 
forts west of the Mississippi, and I've now 
taken on the mission of-just to satisfy myself, 
to try to visit those 50 forts, and maybe write a 
book, or something about that. I don't think 
anybody's ever visited all fifty-all the forts 
don't exist anymore, but at least I know where 
they are-or where they were, and so far I've 
only got two of them under my belt. So I've got 
48 left to do. 
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